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Note
Eliminating Conflict at the Termination of the
Attorney-Client Relationship: A Proposed
Standard Governing Property Rights
in the Client's File
Brian J. Slovut
A client dismisses her attorney and requests that her file
be transferred to her new attorney. The first attorney transfers
the file but withholds handwritten notes and research memo-
randa. The client protests, asserting that the entire file is her
property. The attorney contends that only the end products,
such as finalized contracts, filed motions, and correspondence,
belong to the client. The winner between these two claimants
will vary from state to state, and in many states, because no
clear standard exists, the parties must go to court to determine
their respective rights.
Only a few courts have addressed this ownership issue, and
they have come down on opposite sides of the question.1 A few
state professional responsibility boards and bar associations
have also adopted guidelines.2 From these court decisions and
ethics opinions, two general standards emerge. One places
ownership of the entire file with the client. Courts adopting
this standard have focused on the fiduciary nature of the attor-
ney-client relationship and on the benefit the attorney owes the
1. Compare, e.g., Resolution Trust Corp. v. H-, P.C., 128 F.R.D. 647, 650
(N.D. Tex. 1989) (holding that the client was entitled to all file contents) with
Federal Land Bank v. Federal Intermediate Credit Bank, 127 F.R.D. 473, 480
(S.D. Miss.) (holding that the client was entitled only to the end products in
the file), aff'd in part and rev'd in part on other grounds, 128 F.R.D. 182 (S.D.
Miss. 1989).
2. See, e.g., Minnesota Lawyers Professional Responsibility Bd., Op. 13
(1989) (distinguishing documents that are clients' property from those that are
not); State Bar of Mich., Informal Op. CI-722 (1982) (stating that clients are
entitled to all documents in the file, including all notes and memoranda).
This Note uses the phrase "end product standard" to describe any stan-
dard which does not place ownership in the entire file with the client. Courts
and ethics opinions adopting the end product standard articulate somewhat
distinct standards.
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client. The other standard divides ownership between the at-
torney and client. Courts adopting this standard have distin-
guished the tools of the attorney from the end product created
by those tools, and have sought to protect an attorney's
thoughts and ideas from intrusion.
To eliminate the potential disputes between an attorney
and a client upon termination of their relationship, clear stan-
dards governing the ownership of client files must be devel-
oped. This Note seeks to illustrate the problems of competing
attorney and client interests over ownership of client files.
Part I of this Note examines the conflicting ethics opinions and
court decisions, the policies behind the case law, and the under-
lying ethical considerations. Part II examines the extent to
which current approaches satisfy an attorney's ethical duties
and further underlying policies. Part III offers a scheme that
balances the policies and provides a standard that precisely de-
fines the boundaries of attorney and client ownership. This
Note concludes that attorneys should have ownership rights in
notes and intraoffice communications, and that clients should
have an ownership interest in the rest of the contents of the
file. This interest should be absolute for some documents and
conditional for others.
I. THE UNCERTAIN AND CONFLICTING CURRENT
STATE OF THE LAW
Two problems impede the determination of who owns the
documents in a client's file.3 First, in many states, no clear
standard defines who owns which documents within the client's
file.4 Second, the standards that do exist are inconsistent.5
3. Several situations may require a determination of who owns docu-
ments within the file. These include a client changing attorneys, a bankrupt
client's trustee seeking access to the file, and a widow claiming the property
left her by her husband included her husband's legal file. See infra part I.B.
The ownership issue commonly becomes significant when the client termi-
nates the attorney-client relationship. Note that the attorney's duty remains
the same regardless of the reason for the termination. See MODEL RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.16 cmt. (1983) ("Even if the lawyer has been
unfairly discharged by the client, a lawyer must take all reasonable steps to
mitigate the consequences to the client.").
4. See infra part I.A.2. (describing the opinions issued by the few state
ethics boards that have addressed this issue) and part I.B. (discussing the
sparse case law on the issue).
5. If every state had a definitive standard, the inconsistency among the
various standards would be inconsequential. Many states, however, lack a
standard. The inconsistency becomes significant when states without stan-
dards look to other states for guidance.
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In general, current standards fall into one of two catego-
ries. The "entire file" standard gives the client ownership of all
documents within the client's file.6 Under this standard, the at-
torney must turn over the entire contents of the file upon the
client's request.7 In adopting this standard, courts have re-
jected the contention that attorneys should have a property in-
terest in all or some of their work product.8
The "end product" standard divides ownership in the file
between clients and their attorneys. Clients own the end prod-
ucts, and their attorneys own some or all of their work product.
The precise articulation of this standard varies among courts
and ethics boards.9
A. THE ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS
Attorney conduct both during the representation of a client
and at the termination of the attorney-client relationship is de-
fined in part by the attorney's ethical duties.10 Therefore, any
ownership standard affecting the attorney-client relationship
must be consistent with these ethical duties.
1. The Model Rules of Professional Conduct as a Guideline
Disputes over the ownership of client files generally arise
at the termination of the relationship. The American Bar Asso-
6. See, e.g., Resolution Trust Corp. v. H-, P.C., 128 F.R.D. 647, 650 (N.D.
Tex. 1989).
7. 1i The courts holding that the attorney has no ownership interest
have responded to a variety of arguments. For example, one attorney asserted
that to force him to give up the file would violate his right not to incriminate
himself. See In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 727 F.2d 941, 941 (10th Cir.), cert
denied, 469 U.S 819 (1984). Another attorney made multiple claims, including
the work product doctrine, the attorney-client privilege, and straight owner-
ship rights. See Resolution Trust, 128 F.R.D. at 648.
8. Resolution Trust, 128 F.R.D. at 650; see also In re Kaleidoscope, Inc.,
15 B.R. 232, 244 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1981), rev'd on other grounds, 25 B.R. 729
(N.D. Ga. 1982).
9. See Federal Land Bank v. Federal Intermediate Credit Bank, 127
F.R.D. 473, 480 (S.D. Miss.) (holding an attorney's work product to be his or
her personal property), aff'd in part and rev'd in part on other grounds, 128
F.R.D. 182 (S.D. Miss. 1989); Corrigan v. Armstrong, Teasdale, Schlafly, Davis
& Dicus, 824 S.W.2d 92 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992) (holding that the client has tangi-
ble property rights only in final documents); Gries Sports Enters. v. Cleveland
Browns Football Co., Nos. 49184, 49197, 1985 WL 7995, at *13 (Ohio Ct. App.
Apr. 25, 1985) (holding that clients are not entitled to their attorneys' internal
notes or memoranda), rev'd on other grounds, 496 N.E.2d 959 (Ohio 1986).
10. The Model Rules of Professional Conduct describes itself as part of a
"larger context shaping the lawyer's role." MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCT scope (1983).
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ciation's Model Rules of Professional Conduct (Model Rules)
provides that upon termination:
[A] lawyer shall take steps to the extent reasonably practicable to
protect a client's interests, such as ... surrendering papers and prop-
erty to which the client is entitled and refunding any advance pay-
ment of fee that has not been earned .... The lawyer may retain
papers relating to the client to the extent permitted by other law.'
1
In addition, the attorney's ownership rights are limited by
the attorney's duty of confidentiality, which continues after
representation has concluded.' 2 The Model Rules also require
that the attorney keep the client "reasonably" informed.
13
Although the rules require only that the attorney provide in-
formation to the client, not necessarily documents,14 the rules
raise ethical questions about what information within the docu-
ments must be disclosed.' 5
2. ABA and State Ethics Board Opinions
The ABA and some state ethics boards have issued opin-
ions treating ownership of the client file as a matter of profes-
11. Id Rule 1.16(d). Note that the rule does not state to which papers the
client is entitled. The ABA has more specifically addressed the issue in ABA
Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Informal Op. 1376 (1977).
See infra note 20.
Courts have looked to state rules similar to Model Rule 1.16(d) when ad-
dressing the ownership question. See, e.g., Kaleidoscope, 15 B.R. at 241; Corri-
gan, 824 S.W.2d at 97.
Note that these rules are meant as guidelines, not rules of law, and may
subject an attorney to professional sanction. See MODEL RULES OF PROFES-
SIONAL CONDucr scope (1983).
12. Model Rule 1.6(a) states: "A lawyer shall not reveal information re-
lating to representation of a client unless the client consents after consultation
...." The comment following Rule 1.6 reiterates that "[a]fter withdrawal, the
lawyer is required to refrain from disclosure of the client's confidences."
13. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDucT Rule 1.4 (1983). The Rule
requires that:
(a) A lawyer shall keep a client reasonably informed about the status
of a matter and promptly comply with reasonable requests for
information.
(b) A lawyer shall explain a matter to the extent reasonably neces-
sary to permit the client to make informed decisions regarding the
representation.
Id,
14. Id
15. Courts adopting the entire file standard have reasoned that the attor-
ney's duty of disclosure compels attorneys to turn over to their clients all doc-
uments in the legal file. See, e.g., Resolution Trust Corp. v. H-, P.C., 128
F.R.D. 647, 648-49 (N.D. Tex. 1989). An end product standard court has inter-
preted this duty differently, focusing on the conveying of information rather
than on the turning over of documents. See Corrigan, 824 S.W.2d at 98.
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sional ethics.16 Just as court decisions have been inconsistent,17
so too have the opinions of ethics boards.'8 Ethics opinions gen-
erally serve as guidelines for lawyers, and violating them may
subject an attorney to discipline.19
Interpreting the Model Rules, the ABA issued an informal
ethics opinion adopting an end product standard for client
files.20 The opinion states that attorneys are not obliged to de-
16. See, e.g., Minnesota Lawyers Professional Responsibility Bd., Op. 13
(1989) (defining which documents are "client files, papers, and property");
ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Informal Op. 1376
(1977) (describing which documents the attorney must deliver to the client).
This Note treats opinions defining those documents to which the client is enti-
tled as equivalent to opinions which define those documents the client owns.
17. See infra part I.B.
18. Compare ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, In-
formal Op. 1376 (1977) (adopting an end product standard) with State Bar of
Mich., Informal Op. CI-722 (1982) (adopting the entire file standard).
19. See, e.g., Minnesota Lawyers Professional Responsibility Bd., Op. 1
(1972) (amended 1987) (describing the effect of opinions). The authority of
ABA ethics opinions depends on whether a state adopts their reasoning. See
ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Informal Op. 1420
(1978); see also Gries Sports Enters. v. Cleveland Browns Football Co., Nos.
49184, 49197, 1985 WL 7995, at *13 (Ohio Ct. App. Apr. 25, 1985) (citing ABA
Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Informal Op. 1376 (1977)),
rev'd on other grounds, 496 N.E.2d 959 (Ohio 1986).
20. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Informal Op.
1376 (1977). This opinion, although prepared in response to an inquiry regard-
ing a trademark case, is phrased in general terms and has been used as author-
ity in a non-trademark case. See Gries Sports, 1985 WL 7995, at *13 (stating
that "the standard set forth [in the ABA opinion] is appropriate in most, if not
all, instances involving any attorney-client relationship"). The ABA opinion
states:
The attorney clearly must return all of the material supplied by the
client to the attorney. He must also deliver the 'end product'-the
certificates or other evidence of registration of the trademark which
he was employed to procure and for which the client has paid. Such
items as searches ordered for the client's matter and likewise paid for
by the client presumably may have utility to the client and should be
delivered to the client.
On the other hand, in the Committee's view, the lawyer need not
deliver his internal notes and memos which have been generated pri-
marily for his own purposes in working on the client's problem.
Between these extremes are the items about which you may be
uncertain. In the Committee's view, upon request by the client you
should deliver all other material which is useful to the client in bene-
fiting fully from services he has purchased from you. From your de-
scription, this would appear to include all significant correspondence,
applications and material filed in aid thereof, receipts, documents re-
ceived from third parties, significant documents filed in the adminis-
trative and court proceedings, finished briefs whether filed or not if
they pertain to the right of the client to the use or registration of the
mark in question.
It must be kept in mind that the Committee cannot answer ques-
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liver their "internal notes and memos" to a client.21 The attor-
ney must, however, deliver the end products to the client. In
addition, the attorney should deliver to the client "other mate-
rial which is useful to the client in benefiting fully from serv-
ices he has purchased."22 The opinion explains, however, that
the precise question of what is the attorney's property and what
is the client's property is one of law.
23
The Minnesota Lawyers Professional Responsibility Board
also has adopted a form of the end product standard.24 In con-
tions of law. In the gray areas, what is the lawyer's property and
what is the client's property in a particular case are questions of law
governed by the law of the applicable jurisdiction. The ethical princi-
ples involved are simple. The client is entitled to receive what he has
paid for and the return of what he has delivered to the lawyer. Be-
yond that, the conscientious lawyer should not withhold from the cli-
ent any item which it could reasonably be anticipated would be useful
to the client. How these principles are to be applied in individual
cases is, of course, not easy. The respective interests of the lawyer
and client can be protected by court order in an adversary proceeding
or by a private agreement if the parties can agree.
ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Informal Op. 1376
(1977) (citation omitted).
21. More specifically, the opinion states that "the lawyer need not deliver
his internal notes and memos which have been generated primarily for his
own purposes in working on the client's problem." ABA Comm. on Ethics and
Professional Responsibility, Informal Op. 1376 (1977).
22. I&
23. Id, As noted above, however, a court has cited the opinion as support
for its decision on ownership of a client file.
24. Minnesota Lawyers Professional Responsibility Bd., Op. 13 (1989).
This Minnesota opinion states:
Client files, papers and property, whether printed or electronically
stored, shall include:
1. All papers and property provided by the client to the lawyer.
2. All pleadings, motions, discovery, memorandums, and other
litigation materials which have been executed and served or filed re-
gardless of whether the client has paid the lawyer for drafting and
serving and/or filing the document(s).
3. All correspondence regardless of whether the client has paid
the lawyer for drafting or sending the correspondence.
4. All items for which the lawyer has advanced costs and ex-
penses regardless of whether the client has reimbursed the lawyer for
the costs and expenses including depositions, expert opinions and
statements, business records, witness statements, and other materials
which may have evidentiary value.
Client files, papers and property, whether printed or electroni-
cally stored, shall not include:
1. Pleading, discovery, motion papers, memoranda and corre-
spondence which have been drafted, but not sent or served if the cli-
ent has not paid for legal services in drafting or creating the
documents.
2. In non-litigation settings, client files, papers and property
shall not include drafted but unexecuted estate plans, title opinions,
[Vol. 76:14831488
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trast to the ABA opinion, the Minnesota opinion defines pre-
cisely what documents the client owns.2s The opinion grants
clients ownership of documents used strategically, either filed
in court or sent to an adversary.2 6 In addition, clients own
drafted documents not yet filed or sent for which they have
paid.27 The opinion also forbids attorneys from withholding
documents when to do so would "substantially prejudice" their
clients' interests.2s
In contrast, the Michigan State Bar Association issued an
articles of incorporation, contracts, partnership agreements, or any
other unexecuted document which does not otherwise have legal ef-
fect, where the client has not paid the lawyer for the services in draft-
ing the document(s) .... [The lawyer [may not] condition the return
of client files, papers and property upon payment of the lawyer's fee.
See Opinion 11 of the Minnesota Lawyers Professional Responsibility
Bd.
A lawyer may withhold documents not constituting client files,
papers and property until the outstanding fee is paid unless the cli-
ent's interests will be substantially prejudiced without the documents.
Such circumstances shall include, but not necessarily be limited to,
expiration of a statute of limitations or some other litigation imposed
deadline. A lawyer who withholds documents not constituting client
files, papers or property for nonpayment of fees may not assert a
claim against the client for the fees incurred in preparing or creating
the withheld document(s).
Id, Other entities that have adopted end product standards include commit-
tees in Connecticut and Wisconsin and in the city of San Diego. Connecticut's
opinion distinguishes between "whatever was produced for dissemination to
the client or others outside the attorney's office, and whatever was the attor-
ney's personal work product (typically, handwritten notes, internal drafts or
memoranda, and the like). The client is entitled to the former but not the lat-
ter." Committee on Professional Ethics, Informal Op. 82-4 (Conn. 1981).
Wisconsin's opinion states that clients are entitled to papers they have
supplied to the attorneys and end products for which they have paid. Commit-
tee on Professional Ethics, State Bar of Wis., Op. E-82-7 (1982), reprinted in
Laws. Man. on Prof. Conduct (ABAIBNA) 801:9106.
San Diego's opinion states that the client is not entitled to "papers or
property which constitute or reflect an attorney's impressions, opinions, legal
research or theories." These documents, "which constitute absolute attorney
work product.., are the 'property' of the attorney, rather than client." Legal
Ethics and Unlawful Practices Comm. of the San Diego Bar Ass'n, Op. 1984-3
(1984).
The Mississippi State Bar Association issued an opinion stating that attor-
ney ownership of specific documents in the file is a matter of law, but further
stated that "the lawyer's work product is generally not considered the prop-
erty of the client, and the lawyer has no ethical obligation to deliver his work
product." Mississippi State Bar Ass'n, Op. 144 (1988), reprinted in Ethics
Opinions, MISS. LAW., Mar./Apr. 1988, at 14-16.
25. Minnesota Lawyers Professional Responsibility Bd., Op. 13 (1989).
26. Id
27. Id.
28. I&
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opinion stating that attorneys have an ethical duty to deliver
the entire contents of the file to the client upon request.9 A
separate Michigan ethics opinion, however, articulated a possi-
ble exception for documents containing the attorney's views on
the client's character or competency.30
The majority of state ethics committees, however, appear
to be silent on this issue or have expressly stated that the issue
is a matter of law and thus outside of their jurisdiction.3 1
B. TREATMENT BY THE COuRTS
1. The Entire File Standard
The courts in Resolution Trust Corp. v. H-, P.C 3 2 and In
re Kaleidoscope, Inc.s adopted the entire file standard for simi-
29. Committee on Professional and Judicial Ethics of the State Bar of
Mich., Op. CI-722 (1982). The opinion states: 'Where a former client requests
the file and the attorney has possession of the file, the attorney has an ethical
duty to deliver the file to the former client, or his newly retained counsel ....
[A]U notes, memoranda, correspondence and other items in the file should be
included .... " 1i
30. Committee on Professional and Judicial Ethics of the State Bar of
Mich., Op. CI-743 (1982). The opinion, after stating that "[s]ubstituted counsel
is entitled to the benefit of the lawyer's 'work product' for which the client
has paid a fee," asserts that: "[The client] is not entitled per se to any and all
documents contained in a lawyer's legal file. Specifically [documents contain-
ing] a lawyer's personal observations... with respect to a client's character or
competency traits particularly if and when negative, probably should not be
released." I-
31. See Ethics Comm. of the Ky. Bar Ass'n, Op. E-300 (1985) (asserting
that the ownership question is one of law and that the ethics committee lacked
jurisdiction to decide legal questions (citing ABA Comm. on Ethics and Profes-
sional Responsibility, Informal Op. 1384 (1977))). In addition, some commit-
tees simply state that the lawyer must turn over client files or papers to which
the client is entitled, but do not define which papers those are. See Profes-
sional Ethics Comm. of the State Bar of Tex., Op. 395 (1980) (stating that "[a]
lawyer may not refuse to relinquish his client's files"), reprinted in Laws.
Man. on Prof. Conduct (ABA/BNA) 801:8301.
32. 128 F.R.D. 647 (N.D. Tex. 1989).
33. 15 B.R. 232 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1981), rev'd on other grounds, 25 B.R. 729
(N.D. Ga. 1982). The district court reversed the bankruptcy court's decision
because it believed the ownership question to be governed by state law, and
the law on the issue was not decided in Georgia. In re Kaleidoscope, Inc., 25
B.R. 729, 742-43 (N.D. Ga. 1982).
This Note will discuss the bankruptcy court's opinion for two reasons:
first, the bankruptcy court extensively discussed the rationale for the entire
file standard, and second, although the opinion lacks authority within Georgia,
other courts have cited the opinion regarding the ownership issue, generally
without giving reasons for doing so. E.g., In re Michigan Boiler & Eng'g Co., 87
B.R. 465, 468 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1988); In re Investment Bankers, Inc. v. Da-
vis, Gillenwater & Lynch, 30 B.R. 883, 886-87 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1983). In addi-
tion, the Resolution Trust court cited Kaleidoscope as support, stating that "its
1490 [Vol. 76:1483
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lar reasons. The courts focused on the fiduciary nature of the
attorney-client relationship, the financially created obligations
of the attorney, and the traditional practices of attorneys.
In Resolution Trust, a client suspected that its attorneys
might be altering certain documents within the client's file and
later demanded possession of the file. 4 The law firm refused
to transfer the entire file, claiming ownership in some docu-
ments.35 The court rejected the law firm's claim, and decided
that under Texas law the entire contents of the file belong to
the client.36
In Kaleidoscope, a bankruptcy trustee moved to have the
debtor's law firm turn over all legal files created during repre-
sentation.3 7 The court rejected arguments advanced by the law
firm in opposition to the motion, stating that the client "is enti-
tled to the entire file."38 Because the trustee's and client's
rights to the files are equivalent, the court reasoned, the trustee
is entitled to the entire contents of the file.39
The Resolution Trust and Kaleidoscope courts offered a
number of rationales in support of the entire file standard,
many of which centered on the nature of the attorney-client re-
lationship.40 Both courts relied on the fiduciary nature of the
attorney-client relationship.41 As the client's fiduciary, the at-
torney must exercise "the highest duty of good faith and dili-
gence."' 2  The Resolution Trust court asserted that the
reasoning and conclusion fully support this Court's analysis." 128 F.R.D. at
649.
34. 128 F.R.D. at 647.
35. Id. at 648.
36. Id at 651.
37. In re Kaleidoscope, Inc., 15 B.R. 232, 234 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1981), rev'd
on other grounds, 25 B.R. 729 (N.D. Ga. 1982). Other courts have also followed
the entire file standard in bankruptcy situations. See, e.g., Michigan Boiler, 87
B.R. at 469 (stating that where legal files are amassed jointly, "the entire con-
tents of those legal files belong jointly to the clients in question" (quoting Ka-
leidoscope, 15 B.R. at 244)); Investment Bankers, 30 B.R. at 887 (stating that
"[t]he trustee is the successor in interest to the debtor, and [therefore] has a
right to the production of the files and disclosure of all information pertinent
to that representation"); In re Calestini, 321 F. Supp. 1313, 1316 (N.D. Cal.
1971) (reasoning that because the bankrupt client had a property interest in all
materials in the legal file, this property interest passed to the trustee).
38. Kaleidoscope, 15 B.R. at 234, 241.
39. Id. at 240.
40. Resolution Trust Corp. v. H-, P.C., 128 F.R.D. 647, 648-49 (N.D. Tex.
1989). The Kaleidoscope court spoke of "a common sense analysis of the rela-
tionship between attorney and client." 15 B.R. at 240.
41. Resolution Trust, 128 F.R.D. at 648; Kaleidoscope, 15 B.R. at 244.
42. Resolution Trust, 128 F.R.D. at 649 (quoting Kaleidoscope); Kaleido-
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fiduciary duty required the attorney to "disclose all information
to the client. ' 43 Both courts asserted that this duty prohibits
the attorney from limiting the documents to which a client may
have access.44 Therefore, the courts concluded, the fiduciary
duty requires that the clients be owners of all documents in the
file.45
The Resolution Trust court grounded the requirement of
total access on the need for an attorney's actions to be subject
to close scrutiny.4 According to the court, complete openness
is necessary for clients, and possibly courts, to ensure that at-
torneys are upholding their fiduciary duties.47 The court rea-
soned that if attorneys may choose what documents to hand
over to their clients, attorneys will be able to shelter them-
selves from scrutiny.48
Both the Resolution Trust and the Kaleidoscope courts
pointed to the financial relationship between attorney and cli-
ent as another rationale to support the entire file standard.49
The courts asserted that clients hire and pay attorneys to repre-
scope, 15 B.R. at 244. The courts correctly described the attorney as a fiduci-
ary. See generally 7 AM. JuR. 2D Attorneys at Law § 119 (1980) ('The
relationship between an attorney and his client is highly fiduciary in its nature
and of a very delicate, exacting, and confidential character, requiring a high
degree of fidelity and good faith.").
43. 128 F.R.D. at 649.
44. IMi at 649-50; Kaleidoscope, 15 B.R. at 244.
45. Resolution Trust, 128 F.R.D. at 650; Kaleidoscope, 15 B.R. at 244. Ac-
cording to these courts, if the attorney could withhold documents from the cli-
ent, information might be withheld, thereby violating the attorney's fiduciary
duty.
Entire file courts have also used the agency nature of the attorney-client
relationship as support. See In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 727 F.2d 941, 943-44
(10th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 819 (1984); Resolution Trust, 128 F.R.D. at 648
(stating that allowing an attorney to withhold documents from a client that he
or she would be required to turn over to a new attorney violates the "agency
nature of the [attorney-client] relationship"); Kaleidoscope, 15 B.R. at 239 (as-
serting that the attorney "is an agent of the highest rank for his principal-his
client"). See generally 7 AM. Jun. 2D Attorneys at Law § 119, ("[fln a limited
and dignified sense the relation between attorney and client is essentially that
of principal and agent.").
46. Resolution Trust, 128 F.R.D. at 649 (stating that the attorney-client re-
lationship must be of "tihe most abundant good faith; absolute and perfect
candor or openness and honesty; the absence of any concealment or deception,
however slight").
47. Id,
48. Ia
49. Id at 650; Kaleidoscope, 15 B.R. at 240-41; see also Grand Jury Pro-
ceedings, 727 F.2d at 944 (stating that "any ownership rights that inure in the
file belong to the client who has presumably paid for the professional services
and preparations made by the attorney").
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sent their interests. 50 Therefore, the courts reasoned, clients
pay for all attorney actions, and this gives the clients a property
interest in everything their attorneys produce, whether it be
notes, internal memoranda, or final contracts. 51 Withholding
any documents from clients deprives them of services for which
they have paid.52
Finally, both courts looked to the traditional practice of
transferring a client's file to a new attorney upon request.53 In
Resolution Trust, the court stated that it was "virtually univer-
sal practice" for attorneys to transfer the entire file without
withholding any materials.M The court rejected the attorney's
argument that this mandate applied only when the transfer was
between attorneys, and not between an attorney and client.5 5
The court reasoned that such a practice would be contrary to
the attorney-client relationship.5 6 Complete openness charac-
terizes the relationship between client and attorney, and there-
fore, the court concluded, anything one lawyer must transfer to
another must also be available to the client.57 The Kaleidoscope
court said that when the attorney-client relationship termi-
nates, the client receives "full and free access" to the legal
file.58
50. Resolution Trust, 128 F.R.D. at 650; Kaleidoscope, 15 B.R. at 240-41.
51. Resolution Trust, 128 F.RD. at 649-50. The Kaleidoscope court stated
that clients hire attorneys to use their "brain power," and that clients are enti-
tled to all manifestations of this power "[r]egardless whether the lawyer's ef-
forts remain, as in simple matters, in his head, or in more complicated matters,
take on tangible form as correspondence, memoranda, notes and the like." 15
B.R. at 240-41. In rejecting a work product doctrine defense, the Grand Jury
Proceedings court stated that clients have rights in their attorneys' thought
processes because they pay for the "labors and efforts" that produce them. 727
F.2d at 945. The Resolution Trust court referred to the cost of legal services
and asserted that "[t]o allow the attorney to decide which materials may or
may not be revealed to the client from its files would deny the client the full
benefit of the services for which he paid, often dearly." 128 F.R.D. at 650.
52. Resolution Trust, 128 F.R.D. at 650; Kaleidoscope, 15 B.R. at 240-41.
53. Resolution Trust, 128 F.R.D. at 648-49; Kaleidoscope, 15 B.R. at 239.
54. 128 F.RD. at 648.
55. Id. at 648-49.
56. Id.
57. See id. To allow otherwise would "impl[y] a more trusting relation-
ship between law firms than between a firm and its client." Id. at 649. The
Resolution Trust and Kaleidoscope courts cited no law on the issue of what an
attorney is required to transfer to the new attorney upon request. The Resolu-
tion Trust court stated that "the parties admitted... the virtually universal
practice of transferring the entire client file to new counsel." 128 F.R.D. at
648. The Kaleidoscope court merely stated that "it is the Court's understand-
ing" that the entire file is transferred. 15 B.R. at 239.
58. Kaleidoscope, 15 B.R. at 239. A different scenario and distinct reason-
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2. The End Product Standard
The courts in Federal Land Bank v. Federal Intermediate
Credit Bank59 and Corrigan v. Armstrong, Teasdale, Schiafly,
Davis & Dicus60 adopted the end product standard, yet rea-
soned differently.61 The Federal Land Bank court focused pri-
marily on the nature and purpose of an attorney's work
product,62 while the Corrigan court focused on the nature of
property rights and the ethical obligations of attorneys.63
In Federal Land Bank, a bank sought to compel its former
law firm to produce certain documents.6 The bank contended
ing gave rise to the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals's decision in In re Grand
Jury Proceedings, 727 F.2d 941 (10th Cir.), cert denied, 469 U.S. 819 (1984). In
that case the court asserted that the client has sole property rights to the file.
See id. at 944. The court did not state that the entire contents of the file be-
long to the client. It did, however, state that "any ownership rights which in-
ure in the file belong to the client." Id In addition, the court rejected the
claim that attorneys might have any privacy interest in their work product in
a non-litigation setting, thus implying that when referring to the file, the court
was including all work product such as notes and memoranda used in repre-
senting the client. Id. at 945. The fact that the court did not expressly speak
in terms of specific documents in the file may indicate that the ownership is-
sue is not firmly decided in the Tenth Circuit.
In Grand Jury Proceedings, the court cited an attorney for contempt
when he refused to produce a client's file for a grand jury hearing despite the
client's consent. Id. at 942. In addition to unsuccessfully claiming that the
work product doctrine applied, the attorney contended that producing the file
would violate the attorney's Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimina-
tion. Id. at 943, 945-46. The court disagreed, stating that because the attorney
holds the fie in a purely representational capacity, the privilege does not ap-
ply. Id. at 945. The court reasoned that the attorney would need an ownership
interest in the file to assert the Fifth Amendment privilege successfully. Id.
The court stated that "fifth amendment assertions have to focus on the surren-
der of property which is '"the private property of the person claiming the
privilege, or At least in his possession in a purely personal capacity .... Id. at
944 (quoting Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85, 90 (1974) (in turn quoting
United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 699 (1944))).
59. 127 F.R.D. 473 (S.D. Miss.), aff'd in part and rev'd in part on other
grounds, 128 F.R.D. 182 (S.D. Miss. 1989).
60. 824 S.W.2d 92 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992).
61. An Ohio court followed the end product standard, but did not articu-
late its reasoning for doing so. See Gries Sports Enters. v. Cleveland Browns
Football Co., Nos. 49184, 49197, 1985 WL 7995, at *13 (Ohio Ct. App. Apr. 25,
1985), rev'd on other grounds, 496 N.E.2d 959 (Ohio 1986). The court simply
compared conflicting ethics opinions and followed the standards adopted by
the ABA and the Connecticut Bar Association. Id.; see supra notes 20-24 and
accompanying text (describing the ABA and Connecticut Bar Association eth-
ics opinions).
62. 127 F.R.D. at 478-80.
63. 824 S.W.2d at 97-99.
64. 127 F.R.D. at 474.
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that the documents were created in the course of the firm's
representation of the bank and therefore were the property of
the bank.65 The law firm, however, claimed an ownership right
in the documents, contending that it owned its work product.6
The court ruled in favor of the law firm, holding that the firm
held the ownership rights in its work product.67
In Federal Land Bank, the court contrasted the nature and
purpose of the attorney's work product with the nature of the
end product.68 The court described an attorney's work product
as merely a tool created and used by the attorney, and there-
fore personal property of the attorney.69 The court reasoned
that the attorney must use rough notes and opinions to repre-
sent the client properly, and thus the client is entitled only to
the finished product.70
The Federal Land Bank court also supported the end prod-
65. Id.
66. Id
67. Id- at 478. The court relied primarily on a San Diego Bar Association
ethics opinion as support for its reasoning and conclusion. I&. at 478-79 (citing
Legal Ethics and Unlawful Prac. Comm., San Diego Bar Ass'n, Op. 1977-3
(1977)). In addition, the court cited the Mississippi State Bar Association as
agreeing with the San Diego opinion. I& (citing Ethics Comm., Miss. State Bar
Ass'n, Op. 144 (1988)).
68. Id. at 478-80. The court defined work product as follows:
Notes taken by the lawyer or others in his firm in conducting... in-
vestigation or research, notes made by the lawyer in preparation for
or while attending a deposition or a trial or meetings, internal memo-
randa and other documents prepared by the lawyer for his use in pro-
viding services to his client constitute the lawyer's work product and
are the property of the lawyer. Likewise, preliminary drafts of con-
tracts, briefs, opinions, pleadings and other documents, the final
drafts of which constitute the lawyer's end products, are the lawyer's
work product and are the property of the lawyer.
Id. at 480.
69. Id. at 479 (citing Legal Ethics and Unlawful Prac. Comm., San Diego
Bar Ass'n, Op. 1977-3 (1977)).
70. Id. The court characterized "end product" as documents strategically
brought to light and "work product" as informal and candid documents, and
asserted that the client expects to have a property interest in the end product,
not the work product. Id. (citing Legal Ethics and Unlawful Prac. Comm., San
Diego Bar Ass'n, Op. 1977-3 (1977)).
The former client in Federal Land Bank claimed that the ethics opinion
relied on by the court was inapplicable because it was issued in response to a
question concerning a contingency fee arrangement. Id The court rejected
this assertion, stating that the method of compensation is irrelevant to the at-
torney's duty to the client or the respective ownership interests of the attor-
ney and client. Id The court asserted that fee arrangements are merely
methods of calculating an attorney's fee and do not alter the nature of the at-
torney-client relationship. Id The court stated that "[u]nder both arrange-
ments, the client is paying for the end result. Under both arrangements, the
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uct standard to protect attorneys' thoughts and ideas from in-
trusion.7 1 The district court in Kaleidoscope expressed this
interest in dictum while reversing the bankruptcy court, stat-
ing: "A lawyer who cannot record freely all of his ideas with-
out fear of later examination by his client may be less likely to
consider fully what both lawyer and client should do in particu-
lar situations and may therefore provide less-informed or ill-
considered representation." 72
In its recent Corrigan decision, the Missouri Court of Ap-
peals faced the ownership issue when a widow claimed that she
had a right to her late husband's legal file.73 The widow con-
tended that because her deceased spouse bequeathed to her all
of his tangible property, she was entitled to his file.74 The
court held for the attorney, stating that the deceased husband
had held no proprietary interest in the file.75
The Corrigan court concluded that a client may have a
right of access to information contained in an attorney's notes
and memoranda, but that this right does not translate into an
ownership interest.76 The court reasoned that the attorney is
lawyer's work product is the tool used by the lawyer to reach the end result."
I&.
71. Id (asserting that the attorney must use "rough blemished opinions"
to "construct the appropriate legal representation," and that the client should
not be entitled to these opinions (quoting Legal Ethics and Unlawful Prac.
Comm., San Diego Bar Ass'n, Op. 1977-3 (1977))).
72. In re Kaleidoscope, Inc., 25 B.R. 729, 743 (N.D. Ga. 1982), revg 15 B.R.
232 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1981). The court stated that this interest in providing at-
torneys with freedom of thought must be balanced against the danger that at-
torneys could use such a freedom to hide possible breaches of their fiduciary
duty to their clients. Id The court abstained from deciding the ownership is-
sue, asserting that "substantial state interests must be considered." Id
The desire to ensure that attorneys may freely and creatively pursue the
representation of clients is not unique to the issue of file ownership. For ex-
ample, the drafters of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure stated that Rule
l's provisions for sanctions are "not intended to chill an attorney's enthusi-
asm or creativity in pursuing factual or legal theories." FED. R. CIv. P. 11 ad-
visory committee's note.
73. Corrigan v. Armstrong, Teasdale, Schlafly, Davis & Dicus, 824 S.W.2d
92 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992).
74. Id. at 94.
75. Id at 95. The end products in the file, such as wills, trusts, and con-
tracts, were not at issue in Corrigan because the attorney already had deliv-
ered them to the client. Id at 93.
76. Id at 95. As would the entire file courts, the client's widow in this
case reasoned that when a client hires an attorney, the client "acquire[s] a
right to the 'fruits of [his or her attorney's] labor,'" and that these "fruits" in-
clude everything in the file. Id at 94. She also claimed that the Missouri
"shop-right" doctrine gave clients a proprietary interest in the file. Id at 95.
The court distinguished that doctrine, stating that it applies only when an em-
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paid to create final documents and to perform services, and that
legal principles give the client ownership in the final docu-
ments.77 Beyond this property interest, however, the client has
a right only to receive information necessary to understand and
use the final documents and to benefit from the attorney's serv-
ices generally.78
The Corrigan court concluded that the ethical duty of the
attorney does not create a property right for the client.79 The
court stated that the attorney's ethical duty to the client cen-
ters around information, not property.8 0 In determining what
conduct fulfills the attorney's fiduciary duties, the court stated
that the ethics rules must be "'interpreted with reference to
the purposes of legal representation and of the law itself.' "81
In so doing, the court concluded that an attorney's duty re-
quires her to turn over documents containing information her
clients need to protect their interests.8 2
ployee, using her employer's property, invents something. Id The employer
in that situation acquires a "non-exclusive license or privilege" to copy the in-
vention. Id An attorney, although employed by the client, does not use
materials or facilities provided by the client. Id. at 95-96.
77. Id at 96.
78. Id The court stated that the client's conditional right of access "does
not fit within the traditional definition of property." Id Therefore, because
the client did not have a property right, he could not bequeath it to his wife.
Id-
79. Id at 98.
80. Id The court cited Missouri Supreme Court Rule 1.16 as requiring the
attorney at termination "to take steps to protect the client's interest, such as
'surrendering papers and property to which the client is entitled .... ' The
attorney, however, may retain papers relating to the client to the extent per-
mitted by other law." Id This rule, according to the court, provides no guide
as to which papers the client is entitled; it is a tautology, for "the client is 'en-
titled' to the papers 'to which he is entitled."' Id
81. Id. at 98 (quoting MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCr scope
(1983)).
82. Id The court discussed the need at termination of attorney-client re-
lationships to protect both clients' and attorneys' interests in the work product
the attorneys create. Id The court detailed what an attorney must do at the
end of a relationship with a client:
Without regard to property rights, the attorney must be required to
turn over to his client any documents for which the client has bar-
gained and paid .... Moreover, there should be no question that the
client has a right of access to the attorney's work product for informa-
tion needed to understand those documents. Likewise, if the attorney
is hired to represent the client in processing or defending a claim, the
client at a minimum must be entitled to those papers required by law
to be filed in an appropriate tribunal and those related papers essen-
tial or necessary to make the former papers meaningful. These may
include pleadings, depositions, interrogatories and the like.
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II. COMPARISON AND CRITICISM OF CURRENT
STANDARDS
The most important goal in adopting a standard governing
ownership of a client file is avoidance of uncertainty at the ter-
mination of the attorney-client relationship. Uncertainty
breeds conflict and litigation. An authoritative and precise
standard avoids uncertainty if it defines the documents to
which the attorney and client are entitled at the termination of
their relationship. Any examination of the strengths and weak-
nesses of standards must also inquire into whether they satisfy
the ethical duties of attorneys, further the policies asserted by
the courts, and infringe on or ignore other valid policy consid-
erations. Such an examination reveals that neither a strict en-
tire file standard nor a strict end product standard satisfactorily
meets these objectives.
A. ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS: ATroRNEY's DUTY AS
FIDUCIARY AT TERMINATION OF THE RELATIONSHIP
Both the entire file standard and the end product standard
satisfy an attorney's ethical duties, but the entire file standard
requires more disclosure than do the ethics rules. The end
product standard satisfies the attorney's ethical duties by focus-
ing on the need to provide information, not the need to provide
documents. The Corrigan court reasoned that the attorney
must disclose whatever the client needs in order to understand
the end products created during the representation. This satis-
fies the Model Rules' requirement that during the relationship
the attorney must keep the client reasonably informed, provide
information sufficient to allow the client to make reasonable
decisions regarding the representation, and take steps to pro-
tect the client's interests.8 3 Nothing in the Model Rules sug-
gests that at the termination of the relationship the attorney
shoulders additional duties beyond those required during the
relationship. The end product standard satisfies the attorney's
83. See supra notes 10-15 and accompanying text. Nonetheless, an attor-
ney could violate the duty of disclosure by withholding documents from the
client. If material information exists in a document, and if the attorney has
not disclosed that information to the client because the relationship with the
client has terminated, the client should receive either the original document
or a copy. The Corrigan court interpreted the duty of disclosure to be a "duty
to grant [the client] access to the information in [his] files which he may have
needed to interpret the documents he requested to be prepared or to otherwise
provide access to the information in the files in order for him to understand
the services they performed." 824 S.W.2d at 98.
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duties at the termination of the relationship by requiring the
surrender of end product and by keeping open the flow of in-
formation between the attorney and the client. The ABA itself
has interpreted the Model Rules consistently with this
standard.84
Courts that adhere to the entire file standard misconceive
the fiduciary duty that an attorney owes to a client. These
courts properly define the attorney's duty as one of "good faith
and diligence,"8 5 but then misinterpret the requirements that
this duty imposes. The entire file courts focus on two aspects of
the fiduciary duty: the requirement of disclosure and the need
for close scrutiny of an attorney's actions.
First, the entire file courts presume that the attorney's
duty of disclosure requires the attorney to turn over all docu-
ments to the client upon request, both during and at the termi-
nation of the attorney-client relationship. The courts base this
conclusion on the belief that the attorney has a duty to disclose
all information to the client.86 The case the Resolution Trust
court cited for this belief stated that an attorney "is obligated to
render a full and fair disclosure of facts material to the client's
representation."87  The requirements that material facts be
fully disclosed and that the entire file be turned over are dis-
tinct. Full disclosure merely requires that the client be in-
formed of material facts, but the entire file standard is likely to
exceed that duty by requiring the attorney to surrender even
those documents that do not contain material facts.88
84. See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Informal
Op. 1376 (1977).
85. See, e.g., In re Kaleidoscope, Inc., 15 B.R. 232, 244 (Bankr. N.D. Ga.
1981), rev'd on other grounds, 25 B.R. 729 (N.D. Ga. 1982).
86. See, e.g., Resolution Trust Corp. v. H-, P.C., 128 F.R.D. 647, 649 (N.D.
Tex. 1989) (citing Willis v. Maverick, 760 S.W.2d 642, 645 (Tex. 1988)).
87. Willis v. Maverick, 760 S.W.2d 642, 645 (Tex. 1988).
88. Adopting an end product standard, the Federal Land Bank court in-
cluded "rough, blemished opinions" in the attorney's property. Federal Land
Bank v. Federal Intermediate Credit Bank, 127 F.R.D. 473, 479 (S.D. Miss.),
aff'd in part and rev'd in part on other grounds, 128 F.R.D. 182 (S.D. Miss.
1989). Documents containing these rough opinions may not contain any mate-
rial facts, but the entire file standard requires attorneys to turn these docu-
ments over nonetheless. The entire file standard surpasses the duty of
disclosure it attempts to further by giving clients ownership rights in all of the
documents in the clients' files.
Although the end product will likely include any material information
that the attorney produces concerning the client's representation, the attorney
has a duty of disclosure that goes beyond mere document ownership. Whether
or not attorneys own their work product, they are ethically bound to be open
and candid with their clients.
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A second policy supposedly furthered by the entire file
standard is that of attorney scrutiny. Advocates of the entire
file standard contend that placing ownership with the client
permits valuable scrutiny of the attorney's efforts.8 9 The courts
correctly assert that attorneys should be subject to close scru-
tiny by the client and, if necessary, by the court. The entire file
standard, however, reflects the mistaken assumption that own-
ership of the entire file will allow clients to scrutinize their at-
torneys' work more effectively. In reality, the standard paints
with an unnecessarily broad brush. During representation, the
attorney's duty of disclosure satisfies the scrutiny requirement.
If the attorney discloses material information and responds
openly to the client's inquiries, the client will be able to keep
track of the attorney's work. Simply granting a client owner-
ship of all the attorney's notes and memoranda will not further
the client's ability to ensure that the attorney acted properly.
Much of the work product of the attorney will have little
meaning to the client and thus will not help the client to evalu-
ate the attorney's actions.
In addition, when necessary, the rules of civil procedure al-
low for adequate scrutiny, thereby decreasing the need for the
entire file standard. Clients who believe themselves to be in-
jured by their attorneys' conduct may file malpractice actions
and receive the documents through discovery regardless of who
owns the documents.9
Despite its overreaching, the entire file standard generally
upholds the ethical framework established by the Model Rules.
By providing the client with the entire file at the termination
of the relationship, the attorney protects the client's interests,
although the attorney may also need to provide additional in-
formation to the client. The entire file standard will satisfy the
Model Rules requirement of keeping the client "reasonably in-
formed" if the attorney provides the information the client
needs, rather than just the documents in the client's file. The
property rights established by the entire file standard do not
undermine an attorney's ethical duties, and therefore the stan-
dard generally upholds these duties.
89. See Resolution Trust, 128 F.R.D. at 649.
90. Clients' need for access to work product is one reason courts would
not expand the scope of the work product doctrine. To allow an attorney to
assert the work product doctrine against a client would effectively shield the
attorney's work product from the client. Giving the attorney ownership rights
in work product does not interfere with the client's right to use discovery pro-
cedures to gain access to the relevant work product if necessary.
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Thus, both the end product and the entire file standards
satisfy the attorney's fiduciary duty to the client, but the entire
file standard surpasses that which is necessary to fulfill the at-
torney's duties.
B. FULL BENEFIT OF ArORNEY SERVICES
A major difference between the entire file and the end
product standards is their divergent characterizations of what
the client buys when hiring a lawyer. Under the entire file
standard, everything the attorney creates while representing
the client belongs to the client. The end product standard, on
the other hand, reflects the view that the client pays the attor-
ney for certain end products and services, but not for the docu-
ments the attorney used in the process. Neither standard,
however, satisfactorily provides clients what they have paid for
without giving them a windfall.
The entire file standard may provide the client a greater
benefit than the client is entitled to receive.9' This standard
gives the client ownership of documents without regard to
whether the client has paid for the creation of the documents.
For example, if a client were to dismiss an attorney who had all
but completed the drafting of a document such as a will, the
draft would belong to the client regardless of whether the cli-
ent had paid the attorney.92
The end product standard, however, may shortchange a
paying client who, under a stringent interpretation of the stan-
dard such as that articulated by the Federal Land Bank court,
would not be entitled to the nearly completed will even if the
client had paid the attorney.93
91. On the other hand, the entire file standard may actually reduce the
benefit of hiring an attorney by diminishing the quality of the attorney's work.
See infra notes 103-12 and accompanying text (discussing the need to avoid un-
due infringement on an attorney's creative thought).
In addition, the entire file standard provides the client with documents of
little or no worth to the client. The sole benefit of some work product is to
assist the attorney in representing the client, while other work product may
benefit both the original attorney and the client or a new attorney. For exam-
ple, a legal memorandum setting forth the applicable factual background of
the client's situation would likely be of value to a new attorney. In contrast,
rough work product, such as handwritten notes of legal ideas that the attorney
intends to pursue, may have value only to the original attorney.
92. But see supra note 24 (setting forth the Minnesota solution that bases
ownership in some documents on whether the client has paid for their
drafting).
93. See Federal Land Bank v. Federal Intermediate Credit Bank, 127
F.R.D. 473, 480 (S.D. Miss.) (holding that attorneys own their work product,
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The Corrigan court articulated a more moderate standard
under which the attorney must provide the client with those
documents for which the client had bargained and paid, as well
as any information necessary to protect the client's interests.94
Under this standard, the client would most likely receive the
unfinished will. This result, however, is not definite, because
the Corrigan court's approach leaves much open to
interpretation.95
The standard adopted by the Minnesota Lawyers Profes-
sional Responsibility Board provides precise guidance.96 This
standard gives the client unquestioned ownership of the end
products,97 but only a conditional ownership interest in un-
including "preliminary drafts of contracts, briefs, opinions, pleadings and other
documents"), aff'd in part and rev'd in part on other grounds, 128 F.R.D. 182
(S.D. Miss. 1989). The Federal Land Bank court referred to the lawyer's work
product as tools of the trade such as "the tools of a carpenter." Id. at 479 (cit-
ing Legal Ethics and Unlawful Prac. Comm. of the San Diego Bar Ass'n, Op.
1977-3) (1977). The court's analogy is faulty. For example, when a carpenter is
hired to build an addition to a house, the carpenter uses hammers, nails, wood,
and the like. If the carpenter were fired prior to completing the project, the
carpenter would take his or her tools such as hammers and nails, and the cli-
ent would keep the partially built addition. An attorney preparing an estate
plan will most likely use notes, intraoffice communications, and preliminary
drafts. The notes and communications closely resemble the carpenter's tools,
but the preliminary drafts more closely resemble the partially built addition to
the house-the "work in progress." The client should own the preliminary
drafts, and the attorney should own his or her tools of the trade.
94. Corrigan v. Armstrong, Teasdale, Schlafly, Davis & Dicus, 824 S.W.2d
92, 98 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992).
95. If the court's language were interpreted to mean that the client bar-
gained only for the finished will, the client might not be entitled to the unfin-
ished will.
The theories in Corrigan are admirable, but they may leave lawyers guess-
ing as to what they must provide to their clients. The court is correct that the
focus of a lawyer's ethical obligations at the termination of the relationship is
on information, not documents. A standard that defines the documents that
attorneys must surrender to their clients provides a much clearer guide for at-
torneys as well as greater assurance that clients will receive the full benefit of
the services for which they have paid.
96. See supra note 24 (setting forth the Minnesota's Lawyers Professional
Responsibility Board opinion defining client property).
97. Minnesota Lawyers Professional Responsibility Bd., Op. 13 (1989).
Under the Minnesota standard, the client owns and is entitled to documents
falling within the following categories:
1. Documents supplied by the client.
2. Litigation materials that have been executed, served or filed.
3. Correspondence.
4. Items for which the lawyer has advanced costs and expenses which
have evidentiary value.
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served litigation materials and unexecuted legal documents.9 8
Although clearly defined, the standard fails to provide clients
with some documents they properly should receive. For exam-
ple, a client in Minnesota is entitled to "drafted but unexecuted
estate plans" if the client has paid for the time spent drafting
the document.99 This implies that the client is entitled to estate
plans ready for execution, but not preliminary plans. Inter-
preted this way, the rule deprives the client of the preliminary
draft of the plan even though the client has paid for its
drafting. 00
Moreover, none of the articulations of the end product
standard expressly grants the client an ownership interest in
98. I&
99. 1
100. The Minnesota standard is admirable in several respects. First, it
specifies the duties of attorneys at the termination of the attorney-client rela-
tionship. The opinion lists the documents to which clients are entitled, and it
expressly states that attorneys may not withhold the documents, regardless of
whether a fee has been paid. It further lists those specific documents to which
clients are entitled depending on whether the client has paid.
Second, the opinion implicitly recognizes the competing interests at stake.
It does not ignore the interests of attorneys, as does the entire file standard,
nor does it undervalue the interests of clients, as does the standard the Federal
Land Bank court adopted. See supm note 93 and accompanying text. The
opinion balances the interests by dividing those documents in which the attor-
ney's interest in compensation outweighs the client's interest. The opinion
states, therefore, that, "A lawyer may withhold documents not constituting cli-
ent files, papers and property until the outstanding fee is paid unless the cli-
ent's interests will be substantially prejudiced without the documents."
Minnesota Lawyers Professional Responsibility Bd., Op. 13 (1989).
In contrast to the Minnesota opinion, the ABA standard provides a more
general framework that could provide the client with the full benefit of the
attorney's services to which the client is entitled. ABA Comm. on Ethics and
Professional Responsibility, Informal Op. 1376 (1977). It gives the attorney
ownership of personal notes and memoranda and it gives the client ownership
of end product and other material which may be useful to the client. Id. The
standard, however, does not precisely delineate clients' and attorneys' docu-
ments, and although it acknowledges that clients are entitled to receive docu-
ments for which they have paid, it fails to address the effect of payment or
nonpayment on property rights. Furthermore, the opinion qualifies the attor-
neys' rights to their notes and memoranda, leaving open the potential for dis-
pute over specific notes and memoranda. It states that attorneys may retain
their "internal notes and memos which have been generated primarily for
[their] own purposes in working on the client's problem." Id- The question re-
mains as to what "primarily for [their] own purposes" means. In general, the
ABA suggests a standard that recognizes both attorneys' and clients' interests,
but that is not sufficiently specific. The opinion states, "In the gray areas,
what is a lawyer's property and what is the client's property in a particular
case are questions of law governed by the law of the applicable jurisdiction."
I&
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any legal memoranda researched and drafted by the attorney.
If a client dismisses an attorney after the attorney has com-
pleted a research memorandum on a central point in the cli-
ent's situation, this document will clearly benefit the client if
he or she continues to pursue the same matter with another at-
torney.10 1 Just as the client should receive the partially drafted
but paid-for will, the client should receive legal memoranda
used in preparing end products if the client has paid for the
lawyer's services. The client need not pay another attorney to
perform the same research. 0 2
C. REASONS FOR PROTECTING ATrORNEYS' THOUGHTS FROM
INTRUSION
By limiting the documents to which the client is entitled,
the end product standard protects an attorney's thoughts and
ideas from intrusion. 03 Attorneys should be free to use notes
and intraoffice communications without fear that these per-
sonal documents may be claimed by the client. Notes and in-
traoffice communications used solely for the attorney's
guidance provide little benefit if given to the client and may be
misunderstood or even offensive to the client.10 4 In the medical
101. Even if the client has paid the attorney for the time spent drafting the
research memorandum, the memorandum would not be client property under
the Minnesota standard. The research memorandum is neither a document to
be used in litigation nor a document intended to have legal effect. See Minne-
sota Lawyers Professional Responsibility Bd., Op. 13 (1989) (omitting legal
memoranda from client property).
102. Under the standards articulated by the Corrigan court and by the
ABA, the client may be entitled to the research memorandum. Under the
Corrigan standard, or any standard that relies solely on ethics rules regarding
disclosure, the attorney must decide what information the client needs and
what information the client is entitled to receive. See Corrigan v. Armstrong,
Teasdale, Schlafly, Davis & Dicus, 824 S.W.2d 92 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992). With
this uncertainty comes the possibility that a client might disagree with the at-
torney's judgment, which may lead to conflict.
103. The end product standard provides the client only with documents re-
sulting from thought and consideration by the attorney; recorded initial theo-
ries or ideas are not the client's property. These initial notes, theories, and
ideas are necessary to "construct the appropriate legal representation." Fed-
eral Land Bank v. Federal Intermediate Credit Bank, 127 F.R.D. 473, 479 (S.D.
Miss.) (citing San Diego Bar Ass'n, Op. 1977-3), aff'd in part and rev'd in part
on other grounds, 128 F.R.D. 182 (S.D. Miss. 1989).
104. Interestingly, the ethics committee that recognized this had earlier
adopted the entire file standard. The Michigan State Bar Association stated
that notes or memoranda containing a lawyer's observations concerning "a cli-
ent's character or competency traits particularly if and when negative, proba-
bly should not be released." Committee on Professional and Judicial Ethics of
the State Bar of Mich., Op. CI-722 (1982).
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profession, a doctor might record in a patient's file that the pa-
tient is obese. This term, describing a medical condition, most
likely would offend the patient if he or she read her file. Simi-
larly, legal terms such as those involving incompetency might
offend a client who read them without understanding their
meaning.10 5 Although the client pays for the attorney's work,
the payment should not give rise to an ownership interest in
every thought the attorney has regarding the representation.1 06
Attorneys should have some privacy in their work.-0 7
Protecting an attorney's notes also avoids chilling an attor-
ney's efforts on behalf of a client.'0 8 In the initial stages of a
legal matter, an attorney must be free to engage fully in crea-
tive thought and to consider all possibilities. 0 9 Lawyers must
actively think of potential arguments and counterarguments.
In addition, cases and statutes do not always expressly provide
a result that furthers the best interest of the client. Therefore,
the attorney must try to achieve the desired results creatively.
Attorneys should feel free not only to think, but also to record
their thoughts. These recorded thoughts may include ideas
that, if exposed to the client or other counsel, could embarrass
the attorney or damage his or her reputation. If caution chills
the attorney's initial thoughts, the representation suffers." 0
105. Also, an attorney might characterize a client for the purpose of pre-
paring a fellow attorney to deal with the client. This could be helpful for pro-
viding the client with the best service, but would not be something to which
the client should have access. For example, the attorney may explain to an-
other attorney that the client needs to have information explained slowly or
more than once, that the client is temperamental and needs information care-
fully worded, or that the client does not make a credible witness.
106. But see In re Kaleidoscope, Inc., 15 B.R. 232, 241 (Bankr. N.D. Ga.
1981) (asserting that the client should own everything the attorney produces),
rev'd on other grounds, 25 B.R. 729 (N.D. Ga. 1982).
107. But see In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 727 F.2d 941, 944-45 (10th Cir.)
(asserting that the attorney has no privacy interest in the client's file), cert
denied, 469 U.S. 819 (1984).
108. See Kaleidoscope, 15 B.R. at 743.
109. See id.
110. The chilling effect created in this situation is analogous to the chilling
effect spoken of in First Amendment situations. See, e.g., New York Times v.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (protecting against chilling effect on robust public
debate by limiting state defamation laws). In New York Times, the Supreme
Court was concerned that the specter of enormous judgments in defamation
cases based on a low standard of proof might cause the press to be overly cau-
tious, thereby reducing public debate on certain issues.
The entire file standard places an attorney in a position similar to the
newspaper's. The attorney's efforts are chilled by the possibility that prelimi-
nary thoughts and ideas might be disclosed to the client, other attorneys, or to
the public. As restricting the marketplace of ideas harms society, so too is a
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The end product standard, however, surpasses that which
is necessary to protect this privacy interest adequately."'
Many internal memoranda and preliminary drafts protected by
this standard result from considered thought, much like fin-
ished products. Thus, the possibility that documents such as
"preliminary drafts of contracts" 12 may come into the client's
possession is unlikely to chill the attorney's efforts.
III. A PROPOSED SOLUTION: PROTECTING THE
CLIENT'S AND THE ATTORNEY'S INTERESTS
A. METHODS OF IMPLEMENTING A NEW STANDARD
To create certainty, states should adopt standards that
clearly and authoritatively establish which documents the cli-
ent owns and which the attorney owns. Established standards
will reduce conflict at the termination of the attorney-client
relationship.
A legislature, state ethics board, or court could adopt an
ownership standard. Primarily, any standard must provide a
binding guideline for attorneys. In states such as Minnesota
where a professional responsibility or ethics board has jurisdic-
tion to rule on this issue, the board could adopt the standard
pursuant to its rule-making authority."13 In many states, how-
ever, the ethics boards lack this jurisdiction, and other methods
must be used." 4 A statute would provide an authoritative
client harmed by being denied the full benefit of the attorney's creativity. In-
stead of fearing high punitive damage judgments, the attorney, at the very
least, might fear potential conflict with the client or reputational damage.
111. Attorneys are likely to record preliminary thoughts or ideas, or candid
comments in notes and intraoffice memoranda. However, such preliminary
thoughts are not likely to appear in drafts of contracts or research memo-
randa. Nevertheless, under the end product standard articulated in Federal
Land Bank and the Minnesota ethics opinion, the client is not entitled to these
documents. See Federal Land Bank v. Federal Intermediate Credit Bank, 127
F.R.D. 473, 480 (S.D. Miss.), aff'd in part and rev'd in part on other grounds,
128 F.R.D. 182 (S.D. Miss. 1989); Minnesota Lawyers Professional Responsibil-
ity Bd., Op. 13 (1989).
112. Federal Land Bank, 128 F.R.D. at 480.
113. See Minnesota Lawyers Professional Responsibility Bd., Op. 13 (1989).
The Minnesota Lawyers Professional Responsibility Board adopts "guidelines
for the conduct of lawyers," and "[flailure to comply with the standards ...
may subject the lawyer to discipline." Minnesota Lawyers Professional Re-
sponsibility Bd., Op. 1 (1972) (amended 1987).
114. In these states, ethics boards could issue opinions asserting that the
Model Standard proposed in the next section fulfills the attorney's ethical du-
ties. Although this would not have the force of law, it would provide both at-
torneys and courts with a guideline to follow.
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guide to the ownership question. Although state legislatures
have acted in some areas of the attorney-client relationship,115
they have not addressed the ownership issue.
Courts could also adopt a new ownership standard. How-
ever, the fact that litigation must create the opportunity for
courts to establish an ownership standard raises two problems.
First, one purpose of establishing an ownership standard is to
avoid litigation and conflict. Second, for the court to establish a
useful, precisely defined standard, a case must pose all of the
questions needed to flesh out the standard.
A more immediate but inferior solution is to address own-
ership questions in a retainer agreement. Any retainer agree-
ment could include a provision patterned after the standard
this Note proposes. Although this solution would remove un-
certainty for some attorneys and their clients, many attorneys
do not use retainer agreements." 6 This method of implementa-
tion, therefore, is only a partial and temporary solution because
it fails to create a uniform, authoritative standard to serve as a
115. For example, state legislatures have addressed the question of
whether an attorney can exercise a retaining lien against a client's property.
See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 34-3-62 (1991).
116. See William C. Becker, The Client Retention Agreement-The Engage-
ment Letter, 23 AKRON L. REV. 323, 323 (1990) (reporting that many lawyers
do not use retainer provisions except when they are statutorily required).
While many attorneys do not use retainer agreements, that does not ne-
gate the value to some attorneys of a retainer agreement with an ownership
provision. If the attorney and client discuss property rights prior to represen-
tation and delineate those rights in a retainer agreement, they can avoid fu-
ture conflict. See id- at 324 (stating that "a substantial proportion of the
number of complaints and disciplinary difficulties seen by disciplinary bodies
arise from simple (or complex) misunderstandings between lawyers and their
clients"). If a conflict does arise and either party challenges the provision, a
court should uphold a retainer agreement patterned after the Model Standard
if it does not contradict state law or any authoritative ethics rules. See ABA
Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Informal Op. 1376 (1977)
(stating that the "respective [property] interests of lawyer and client can be
protected . . . by private agreement if the parties can agree"). The Model
Rules limit the lawyer's ability to enter into an agreement with a client that
limits malpractice liability, MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDuCT Rule
1.8(h) (1983), but the Rules do not prohibit defining ownership rights in the
file.
Another advantage of including a provision in the client's retainer agree-
ment is that the attorney and client have the freedom to agree to different
ways of resolving the ownership conflict. They might create a dividing line
based on superficial factors such as whether a document is handwritten or
typed. The attorney and client might agree that all documents belong to the
client, thereby formally adopting the entire file standard. Whatever method
they choose, they will have discussed and resolved the issue before a conflict
occurs.
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guide for all attorneys.117
B. THE MODEL STANDARD
Courts that have adopted the entire file and end product
standards have asserted important policies in support of their
respective positions. The standards are diametrically opposed,
but a standard can be devised that serves to uphold the policies
both sets of courts have identified.. The Model Standard below
upholds the asserted policies by balancing the client's interests
and the attorney's interests.
THE MODEL STANDARD
I. Documents the Client Owns
A. All documents supplied by the client.
B. All litigation materials filed or served.
C. All correspondence to and from an opposing party.
D. All documents of evidentiary value, such as records of depo-
sitions; expert opinions; witness statements; and business records, in-
cluding attorney notes recording information from depositions,
witness statements, or expert opinions.
E. All executed legal documents, including valid wills.
II. Documents the Client Owns if the Client has Paid for
Their Creation
A. All drafts, whether preliminary or final, of litigation materi-
als, of documents intended to have legal effect, and of any other docu-
ment intended to be used strategically against another party or for
the direct benefit of the client.
B. All research memoranda concerning the client's legal situa-
tion, whether in completed or in preliminary draft form.
C. Any other documents not within Parts I or III that were cre-
ated in the course of representation.
III. Documents the Attorney Owns
A. All notes recorded in the course of the representation except
those defined in Part I(D).
B. All intraoffice communications except research memoranda.
IV. Provisions That Apply Under this Standard
A. The attorney must turn over to the client the documents
listed in Part II even if they have not been paid for if withholding the
documents would result in substantial prejudice to the client. Upon
turning over documents under this subdivision, the attorney may as-
117. A major benefit of a legislative or judicial solution would be that it
would cover informal attorney-client relationships. Many attorney-client rela-
tionships begin without any written agreement. A statutory or common law
rule would cover all attorney-client relationships, whether formal or informal.
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sert a claim against the client to recover fees owed for the time spent
drafting the documents.
B. The attorney may file a claim for unpaid fees for time spent
drafting documents under Part II even if the attorney retains posses-
sion. If the attorney is successful in collecting the fees the documents
must be turned over to the client.
C. If the attorney is to be paid on a contingency basis and the
relationship terminates, the lawyer is presumed to have been "paid"
for the purposes of Part 11, but may still file a claim for unpaid fees
on a quantum meruit basis or any other basis state law permits.
C. THE MODEL STANDARD PROMOTES ETHICS, VITAL
POLICIES, AND CERTAINTY
1. The Ethics Foundation of the ABA
By using the Model Standard, attorneys will fulfill their
ethical obligations as articulated in the Model Rules. Upon dis-
missal, the attorney must take steps to promote a client's inter-
ests. The Model Standard ensures this by giving the client an
unconditional ownership interest in certain important docu-
ments,118 and by entitling the client to other documents, re-
gardless of whether the client has paid, if being deprived of
them would substantially prejudice the client's interest.119
In addition, the Model Standard satisfies the attorney's
duty of disclosure. As the Corrigan'2 0 court and the Model
Rules' 21 indicate, the attorney's duty of disclosure centers on
information, not documents, and the duty remains the same re-
gardless of who has ownership.
Moreover, the Model Standard is consistent with the
ABA's interpretation of the Model Rules. In an inforinal opin-
ion, the ABA ethics committee stated that the client is entitled
to end products but is not entitled to the attorney's notes and
memoranda. -22 The Model Standard follows these guidelines,
precisely defining "end product" and "notes and memoranda."
2. The Model Standard Balances and Promotes Policies
The Model Standard considers both the client's and the at-
118. See Model Standard, supra p. 1508 (Part I).
119. See Model Standard, supra p. 1509 (Part IV(A)).
120. Corrigan v. Armstrong, Teasdale, Schlafly, Davis & Dicus, 824 S.W.2d
92, 97 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992).
121. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.4 (1983) (using
phrases such as "keep client reasonably informed" and "reasonable requests
for information").
122. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Informal Op.
1376 (1977).
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torney's interests and upholds the policies articulated by the
entire file and end product courts. The Model Standard, like
the end product standard, categorizes documents as attorney
and client property, 2 3 but the Model Standard also expands the
scope of documents to which the client may be entitled.124
Once the client has paid the attorney for the work the attorney
has done, the attorney owns only notes12s and intraoffice com-
munications. All of the other documents the attorney created
during the representation belong to the client if the client has
paid for the time spent drafting the documents. For example, if
the client dismisses the attorney after the attorney has spent
ten hours on answers to interrogatories but has not yet com-
pleted them or sent them to the adversary, the client has an in-
terest in these answers once the client pays for the attorney's
efforts.126 The Model Standard protects clients' interests be-
cause they do not lose their right to the answers simply because
the answers are not finished. It protects attorneys' interests be-
cause the clients do not gain their property right in the answers
until they pay. Of course, attorneys will have to give up the an-
swers if withholding them will cause substantial prejudice to
the clients' interests. 127
123. Part I of the Standard is patterned after the Minnesota end product
standard. Part II of the Standard expands on a similar provision in the Minne-
sota end product standard. See supra note 24 (setting forth the Minnesota
standard).
124. This brings the standard closer to the entire file standard, with differ-
ences including the requirement of payment for documents in part II and the
granting of.limited property rights in part III.
125. This does not include notes taken while recording witness statements,
depositions, and expert opinions, as set forth in part I(D) of the Model
Standard.
126. See Model Standard, supra p. 1508 (Part II).
127. See Model Standard, supra p. 1509 (Part IV(A)). The requirement
that the client pay the attorney before the client may own certain documents
avoids the potentially inequitable result of the entire file standard. The attor-
ney's ethical duty to protect the client's interest at termination of the relation-
ship does not amount to a requirement that the attorney ensure that the client
receives the greatest possible benefit from the attorney regardless of whether
the client has paid. If such a requirement existed, the attorney would need to
complete any work he or she had started prior to termination so that the cli-
ent would not be harmed while looking for a new attorney. The Model Stan-
dard adequately protects the client's interests by giving the client all
documents with legal effect, documents used strategically in litigation, and
correspondence. Beyond this, the client's interest must be in danger of sub-
stantial prejudice for the client to be entitled to additional documents from the
attorney.
In addition, unlike the Minnesota standard, the Model Standard allows
the attorney to assert a claim against the client regardless of whether the at-
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The Model Standard satisfies both the attorney's duty of
disclosure and the need for close scrutiny of the attorney. As
discussed above, the attorney's duty of disclosure requires the
attorney to disclose information rather than provide docu-
ments, and an ownership standard does not affect this duty.
Nevertheless, the entire file courts equate this duty with own-
ership, and the Model Standard nearly rises to the level that
those courts require. The Standard denies clients ownership of
most attorney's notes and intraoffice communications, s but
grants them all research memoranda, drafts of documents, and
other material of this nature for which the client has paid. The
information the entire file courts demand concerning the repre-
sentation is most likely within these documents, for any perti-
nent information in the attorney's notes will manifest itself in
some other document. Similarly, the client's interest in a vast
majority of the documents satisfies the entire file courts' call
for scrutiny and limits attorneys' ability to shield their work
from their clients. 2 9
The Model Standard avoids the potential chilling effect the
entire file standard creates, but the Standard limits its protec-
tion to documents that both the attorney and client have an in-
terest in keeping private. Attorneys should be free to record in
their notes any ideas or thoughts they have without fear of
later examination. Furthermore, attorneys should be free to
communicate openly and candidly with other attorneys in their
offices concerning clients and their legal situations. Both of
these valuable activities will be chilled if attorneys must con-
sider the potential for exposure whenever they write a note or
torney supplies the client with the documents. Assuming the attorney acted in
the client's interest until the relationship ended, the attorney should be com-
pensated for the time spent working regardless of whether the attorney sur-
renders the document before an action to collect unpaid fees.
128. The tools of the trade analogy used in Federal Land Bank v. Federal
Intermediate Credit Bank, 127 F.R.D. 473 (S.D. Miss.), aff'd in part and rev'd
in part on other grounds, 128 F.R.D. 182 (S.D. Miss. 1989), applies to the Model
Standard, but with a different interpretation of what makes up the attorney's
tools. Under part III of the Model Standard, attorneys' notes and intraoffice
communications are the tools they use to create legal documents and to con-
struct arguments.
129. The Resolution Trust court was concerned that without an entire file
standard, attorneys would be able to choose which documents to turn over to
the client. Resolution Trust Corp. v. H-, P.C., 128 F.R.D. 647, 649 (N.D. Tex.
1989). Under the Model Standard, attorneys lack discretion over which docu-
ments they may withhold; the standard narrowly defines the documents that
the attorney owns. Of course, attorneys do have discretion to decide whether
to give clients documents that the attorneys own.
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memorandum. The Model Standard avoids this chilling effect
by giving attorneys a property interest in their notes and mem-
oranda where the risk of a chilling effect is greatest.
CONCLUSION
The ownership interests of clients and attorneys should be
precisely defined to balance the attorneys' and clients' interests
with the attorneys' ethical duties. This Note suggests dividing
the documents in clients' files into three categories: documents
owned by clients without condition, documents owned by cli-
ents only to the extent the clients have paid, and documents
owned by attorneys. This balancing of the policies involved rec-
ognizes the interests of attorneys and clients, enhancing the
quality of representation and diminishing the potential for
conflict.
